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Paul E. Comeaux & N. Stephan Kinsella, “Reducing Political Risk in Developing Countries: Bilateral Investment Treaties, Stabilization Clauses, and MIGA & OPIC Investment Insurance , 15 New York Law School Journal of International and Comparative Law 1 (1994)

This article, co-authored with my law school friend and colleague Paul Comeaux, summarizes ways international investors could reduce or respond to political risk in host states. This article was a synthesis of some previous articles my friend Comeaux and I had written, namely:

These articles, in turn, were inspired, in part, by a course, “The International Law of Natural Resources” that Paul and I took at the London School of Economics when pursuing our LL.M. degrees at the University of London in 1991–92. The course was taught by one of the world’s leading international law experts, the extremely impressive Rosalyn Higgins, later president of the International Court of Justice, and author of many influential works, such as Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It.

This article led to our book Protecting Foreign Investment Under International Law: Legal Aspects of Political Risk (Dobbs Ferry, New York: Oceana Publications, 1997), which, in turn, led to a later book, International Investment, Political Risk, and Dispute Resolution: A Practitioner’s Guide, by me and Noah D. Rubins (Oxford, 2005) and a second edition with me, Rubins, and Thomas N. Papanastasiou (Oxford 2020).

I go into more detail about some of this in New Publisher, Co-Editor for my Legal Treatise, and how I got started with legal publishing.

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“Political Risk” (1997)

From: Chapter I.1, “Political Risk,” in Transnational Contracts, Vol. 1, edited and compiled by Charles Stewart (Dobbs Ferry, New York: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1997)

See also Rubins, Papanastasiou & Kinsella’s International Investment, Political Risk, and Dispute Resolution: A Practitioner’s Guide, Second Edition.

Chapter 1  Political Risk

  • In this chapter, we discuss the general nature of political risk: the various types or manifestations of political risk, factors that contribute to political risk, and ways that investors can assess the political risks inherent in particular investment regimes or with respect to certain investments.

[continue reading…]

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Lithuania’s Proposed Foreign Investment Laws: A Free-Market Critique

Below is the text of Lithuania’s Proposed Foreign Investment Laws: A Free-Market CritiqueRussian Oil & Gas Guide p. 60 (Vol. 3, No. 2, April 1994). [See also Comments on Draft Law on Stimulation of Foreign Investments in Romania.]

This resulted from the following project: Comments on Draft Project of “Law on Foreign Capital Investment in the Republic of Lithuania, Memorandum to Mr. M. Černiauskas, President, Association of Lithuanian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (November 18 1993). I have appended this text below as well.

Lithuania’s Proposed Foreign Investment Laws: A Free-Market CritiqueRussian Oil & Gas Guide p. 60 (Vol. 3, No. 2, April 1994).

Lithuania’s Proposed Foreign Investment Laws:  A Free Market Critique

N. Stephan Kinsella Jackson & Walker, L.L.P. Houston

[For current author info as of 12-2001: see: www.stephankinsella.com]

February 1994

Draft Submitted to The Russian Oil & Gas Guide

May differ slightly from version published in: The Russian Oil & Gas Guide, vol. 3, no. 2 (April 1994), p. 60

[Some formatting does not match published version]

  1. Introduction

Are foreign investors welcome in Lithuania?  The answer to this question depends upon whether Lithuania is willing to protect investors’ property rights so that they have an incentive to invest their capital in a risky regime.  A government’s willingness to protect investors’ rights is evidenced, in part, by the contents of its foreign investment laws.

At the time of this writing (December 14, 1993), a Draft Project of “Law on Foreign Capital Investment in the Republic of Lithuania” (hereinafter referred to as the “Draft Law”) was under consideration by the Lithuanian parliament.  An examination of the proposed law’s provisions, including its deficiencies, may be of interest to Western investors.

Mr. M. Černiauskas, President of the Association of Lithuanian Chambers of Commerce and Industry, recently contacted Mr. E. Blake Mosher, Chief Executive Officer of Mosher International, Inc., to request Western comments on the Draft Law.  Mr. Mosher subsequently contacted me to offer me the chance to comment upon the Draft Law prior to its being voted upon by the Lithuanian parliament.  At this writing, the Draft Law is still apparently under consideration by the parliament.  The following analysis is based on the comments I submitted to Mr. Černiauskas.

  1. The Draft Law

According to Article 1, the purpose of objective of the Draft Law is to “regulate relations between legal persons registered in the Republic of Lithuania and other foreign states, citizens of other states and stateless persons, making investments of their owned assets in the Republic of Lithuania . . . .”  The law also regulates “relations between the State and foreign investors, as well as foreign capital investments during the whole period of their existence.”

The law is not intended to regulate “the emergence, transformation and termination of ownership and related legal issues between foreign investor (investors) and legal and natural persons of the Republic of Lithuania . . . .”  Nor does the Draft Law “regulate relations between citizens of the Republic of Lithuania and those of foreign states, stateless persons or legal persons of other foreign states, participating in the process of privatization of state property.”

Thus, the main purpose of the Draft Law is to provide a framework governing investments in Lithuania by foreign investors.  This is accomplished by providing what types of investment are permissible (and in which sectors of the economy), and by providing for a licensing system and for investment guarantees.

  • General Considerations–Protection of Private Property Rights

As a general proposition, Lithuania will be successful in attracting foreign capital investments in proportion to foreign investors’ ability to make (and keep) profits by investing there.  Protection of investors’ property rights is essential to this.  The more that private property is protected in Lithuania, the greater an investor’s ability to make more long-range future plans, which increases the chances of success and also increases the amount of profits which can be expected.

Additionally, if an investor’s property rights are well-protected, he is also more likely to be willing to invest in Lithuania in the first place, since he has more confidence that he will be able to keep any profits he earns.  A strong Lithuanian policy of protection of private property will reduce the political risk of doing business in Lithuania, which will increase the amount of profits that can be earned and will decrease the costs of doing business, thereby attracting more investments in Lithuania.

Therefore, the more that property rights are protected, the more investments Lithuania will attract.  Further, Lithuania gives up nothing at all by strengthening investors’ private property rights–except the discretion to expropriate or steal investors’ property.  But Lithuania will have to refrain from such expropriations anyway, in order to have a stable and productive market economy and to become successfully industrialized.  Thus, it is virtually costless to Lithuania to increase the protections afforded to foreign investors–for it gives up nothing more than the right to confiscate investors’ property–and this would benefit Lithuania by making it a more attractive place for investors.

With these general considerations in mind, it is clear that the Draft Law should be revised to strengthen as much as possible the protections offered to foreign investors.  Below I discuss some of the ways in which this might be done.[1]  (The Draft Law is provided in the appendix to this article.)  The foreign investment protections discussed below would be equally beneficial to investors in other developing countries, and even in the West.

  1. Analysis
  2. International Commitment–Concessions and Stabilization Clauses

Although the Draft Law purports to give investors certain protections and property rights, there is nothing that would prevent the Lithuanian government from changing this law.  If an investor must rely upon the existence of the law to be sure that his property rights will be respected, then his property rights will be uncertain to the extent the government is likely and able to simply revise or abolish the law which gives his property protections.  Even if the Draft Law were to state that the government may not pass future laws which violate property rights vested in foreign investors by the current law, in reality a future legislature is always able to change the law.

One way to reduce this problem is to internationalize the protections and promises made by Lithuania concerning the sanctity of investors’ property.  This may be done, for example, through a treaty, by which a state obligates itself and becomes bound under international law.  Although this does not physically prevent the state from breaching the treaty, states are, practically speaking, far more reluctant to breach an international obligation than to merely change one of its own internal laws.

Thus the Bilateral Investment Treaties (“BITs”) entered into between some pairs of nations, such as Russia and the United States, offer strong protections for the property rights of foreign investors.  Lithuania should therefore be urged to enter into BITs with the U.S. and other Western states.

International law also recognizes the ability of a state to bind itself internationally through individual contracts between the state and foreign investors, sometimes known as concessions, and referred to herein as investor-state contracts.  Any investor-state contract should contain an international arbitration clause, which can give jurisdiction to a neutral third party (such as the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, or ICSID), as well as a so-called “stabilization clause.”  A stabilization clause would provide that the law in force in Lithuania at a given date–typically, the time the investor-state contract takes effect–is the law that will supplement the terms of the contract, regardless of future legislation, decrees, or regulations issued by the government.

Therefore, all the protections afforded to investors in the Draft Law should be be internationalized, to help ensure that these protections cannot be arbitrarily overturned by a future legislature.  The Draft Law should include a provision authorizing and requiring the government to issue a form contract or license from the state to the investor, which contains international arbitration and stabilization clauses (to internationalize the license), and which incorporates all the protections embodied in the Draft Law as of the date of issuance of the license.  This would extend the protections embodied in the Draft Law into the license, thereby internationalizing and thus strengthening the private property rights afforded in the Draft Law.

Under this system, any time an investor began to invest in Lithuania, he would automatically receive such a license from Lithuania, containing a solemn contractual guarantee from Lithuania to abide by the promises made in its Draft Law, and to not change the internal laws of Lithuania in a way that would diminish the property rights guaranteed to the investor.  Investors receiving such licenses would be more confident that Lithuania does not intend to expropriate their property or raise taxes to a confiscatory rate.

Investors would also feel that a confiscation of their property would be more unlikely to occur, since this would be a breach of international law by Lithuania, which it would probably be reluctant to do.  This would increase Lithuania’s attractiveness and stability, would reduce political risks faced by investors, and would thus encourage greater investment into Lithuania.

  1. Expropriation of Investors’ Property

Article 6: Foreign Investment Guarantees states that “State authority bodies or governmental bodies shall have no right to encroach upon foreign investments or property of foreign investor.”  This seems to indicate that an investors’ property rights should be respected by the government, which implies that the government will not expropriate or nationalize such property.

However, the next paragraph states “Compensation for the appropriated property shall be paid no later than within three months in invested currency or Lithuanian national currency, if capital of an enterprise was formed by non-monetary (property) contributions, according to the actual market value of the property.”  This sentence appears to contemplate government appropriation (i.e., expropriation or nationalization) of investors’ property.

This apparent inconsistency should be eliminated and the law should be clarified.  If no expropriation of private property by the state is to be allowed, the law should not contemplate that it may occur.  If, on the other hand, expropriation is to be allowed, it should be limited in scope to only narrow situations, since any encroachment upon investors’ property rights will harm Lithuania by making it a less attractive place to invest in.

The Draft Law should be revised to clearly state that the government does not have the right to expropriate an investor’s property, nor even the right of eminent domain.  Since values are subjective, it is impossible to determine an “appropriate” amount of compensation to pay an investor for the “value” of the property which is taken.[2]

However, if it is politically unacceptable to remove the government’s power of eminent domain, which is likely, the Draft Law should at least clearly state that, in the event of an expropriation, the full value of the property should be received, which includes the market value of both lucrum cessans (future profits lost) and damnum emergens (damages).  This “full value” standard will help to protect both the value of the investor’s property, as well as the property itself, since the government is less likely to expropriate property, the more compensation it would have to pay for it.

Additionally, the Draft Law should state that investments shall not be expropriated, directly or indirectly (which includes both indirect and “creeping expropriation”), unless the expropriation is:  (1) for a public purpose; (2) performed in a nondiscriminatory manner; (3) accompanied by payment of prompt, adequate and effective (i.e., full value) compensation; and (4) in accordance with due process of law.

The Draft Law should also provide that any legal expropriation that complies with these international law requirements must be accompanied by full compensation, as discussed above.  Any expropriation not in accordance with these provisions should be deemed an illegal expropriation, and a higher amount of compensation should be awarded–for example, the value of the property taken times three, a treble damages standard often found in anti-trust and other laws.  If treble-damages standards are validly used by governments to deter especially egregious private behaviour, it also makes sense to subject governments themselves to similar penalties, to deter them from breaching fundamental international law.

  1. Natural Resources

Article 13: Foreign Capital Investment which is Prohibited without Concession, provides that exploration and exploitation of state owned natural resources is prohibited without a concession.  As discussed above, any property rights acquired by investors should be protected also through a standard form of license or other form of investor-state contract, which internationalizes Lithuania’s promises to respect investors’ property rights.

Certainly a concession, if it contains international arbitration and stabilization clauses, performs this function.  Therefore, the concession described in this Article should provide, similarly to the suggested license, that the concession will contain international arbitration and stabilization provisions.

  1. Taxation

Article 19: Taxation of Enterprises, should be amended to provide that tax rates shall not be raised higher than the rates in effect at the time the investor began its investment; or, that foreign investors shall never be treated less favorably, i.e., taxed at higher rates, than nationals of Lithuania; or both.  The Article should provide that any prohibited increase in taxes includes both direct and indirect tax increases–including the effects of inflation, since price inflation is caused by government expansion of the money supply and is economically equivalent to a tax.

If these guarantees were fortified by the internationalized, routinely-granted license suggested in this paper, investors would be more confident that the taxes in effect currently would not increase and eat away at their profits.  This certainty of the ability to earn and retain profits would be an additional incentive for investors to invest in Lithuania.

Moreover, if Lithuania is able to do so, it should eliminate all tariffs and taxes of whatever kind, except perhaps for a modest amount of sales taxes, which could be imposed on foreign investors, with this regime backed by an internationalized promise as discussed above.  Lithuania could become a tax haven and the resulting rush of investors to invest in Lithuania could transform its economy virtually overnight.  There is nothing preventing Lithuania, or any other country, for that matter, from doing this, other than anti-capitalistic inertia and ideology.

Article 20: Tax Reliefs and Tariffs, provides for income tax reductions for five and three year periods.  These periods should be extended as much as politically feasible, and the percentage reductions on tax rates should be increased as much as politically feasible.

Article 20 also provides that, if an enterprise is voluntarily liquidated during the time when these tax reliefs are in force, or within three years thereafter, the investor must disgorge the “saved” tax reliefs that they received.  This provision is one of the worst provisions in the Draft Law.  It should definitely be abolished.

It is wrong to think that an enterprise can be made to be profitable by force, threats, or coercion, which is what this law amounts to.  This law provides a perverse incentive for companies investing in speculative or risky enterprises to avoid investing in Lithuania, for it effectively increases the potential losses the investor may face.  In order to be successful, businesses must also be allowed to fail when market conditions so dictate.  If firms’ ability to fail is removed, so is the ability to succeed–just as an individual can only be moral if he is free to choose both the right and wrong course of action.  (This parallel between moral flourishing and flourishing in the market is no coincidence, for the free market, a liberal order under which individuals are free and treated as sovereigns, is the moral economic system.)

  1. Leases on State-Owned Land

Article 14: The Right of Enterprises to Use Land Plots and Real Property provides that State-owned land may be leased for enterprise for up to 99 years.  This provision should be amended to allow or even require the government to internationalize any such lease, i.e., to include international arbitration and stabilization clauses in the lease contract to ensure that rights granted to investors-lessees are protected as fully as possible.

  1. Reduce Regulations on Acquisitions of Shares

Article 9: The Right of Acquisition of Shares of Enterprises and Credit Companies requires that foreign investors must procure the consent of the Bank of Lithuania in order to acquire up to 20%, 33%, or 50% of the shares of credit companies.  Such regulations are unnecessarily burdensome and costly for investors, and tend to increase the cost of business and thus reduce the incentive for investment in Lithuania.

Such regulations also presume that the investor has in improper purpose, and are thus a form of “prior restraint.”  However, for law-abiding investors, it should be presumed that the investor has no improper purpose and is attempting to legally and properly make profits by creating wealth.  The requirement to obtain the Bank of Lithuania’s consent before acquiring varying percentages of shares in credit companies should be deleted or diluted as much as politically feasible.

  1. Legal Monopolies and Other Monopolies

Article 10: License to Make a Foreign Investment or to Participate in Certain Types of Activity requires an investor to obtain a license when investing in certain enterprises holding a monopoly in the Lithuanian market.  While a legal monopoly, such as the government’s monopoly over the printing of money or the building of roads, is a true monopoly, the concept of a non-legal monopoly has always been a problematic one, and legal systems would be well-served to abolish this concept.[3]

Typically, “monopoly power” is attributed to any successful company that prospers and grows because it is innovative, efficient, and satisfies its customers’ demands.  Thus to punish firms for being “monopolies” is to punish success and flourishing.  Rather, Lithuania needs to encourage success in order to build a healthy, robust economy.  Therefore Article 10 should be amended to require a license only for investments in legal monopolies, if at all.

  1. Prohibited Investments

Article 12: Investment Object wherein Foreign Capital Investment is Prohibited prohibits foreign investments in certain sectors of the economy.  Some of these are defensible on sovereignty or national security or defense grounds, such as illegal narcotics and weapons.  However, items 5-9–manufacturing of alcoholic beverages; securities, banknotes, coins, and stamps; treating of certain dangerous illnesses; treating animals with certain diseases; and gambling activities–are unduly restrictive.

Each of these activities, as long as they are legal, could benefit from the increased capital, know-how, technology, and competition which would result from allowing foreign investors to invest in these areas.  For example, if wine or beer can be made more cheaply or more efficiently or in greater variety due to foreign capital or control, there is no reason to deny Lithuanian citizens the benefits of having greater options to choose from.  As the successful history of privatization shows, private enterprises can efficiently perform activities historically monopolized by governments, such as minting of coins.  Items 5-9 should therefore be deleted from the list of prohibited investments.

  1. Presumption of Permissiveness of Actions

In the original American constitutional system, it was presumed that all actions by individuals were permissible unless expressly prohibited by government.  This is a general presumption of individual liberty, and it is necessary for any successful society and economy.  The opposite system that has been implemented in certain countries holds that only actions which are expressly permitted by the government are allowed, while anything else is prohibited.  It is essential for businesses that the former system be in place, rather than the latter.

To that end, the Draft Law should contain a provision which provides that, in cases of doubt or ambiguity, or where the Draft Law or other laws are silent, it is presumed that any investment-related activity of a foreign investor is permissible and legal.  Thus, investors would be free to engage in actions not prohibited by the Draft Law.  This would increase the certainty of the legality of options open to investors, and would hence broaden their range of legal options, which increases investors’ chances at making profits.  This, in turn, increases Lithuania’s attractiveness as a host country for investment.

  1. Contract Rights as Property Rights

Often it is unclear whether contractual rights are property rights or something related, but different.  Because contract rights–for example, accounts receivable–are assets as important to many companies as tangible property like land and buildings, the Draft Law should clearly provide that “property” and “property rights” includes all sorts of rights, including immovables such as land, movables such as office equipment, corporeals and incorporeals, intellectual property rights, and contract rights, all of which are equally protected private property rights.

  1. Conclusion

One of the problems the emerging economies of Eastern Europe face is that too much attention is being paid to the advice of Western governments.  Western governments are facing their own problems now, primarily because of too much government interference and regulation in the free market, which, ultimately, is the only creator of wealth.

Eastern Europe should be wary of accepting the advice of Western governments to tax and regulate the market, adopting our IRS, SEC, and anti-trust laws.  The soundest critique of Western economic problems has been that explaining why government intervention and the erosion of individual rights, including property rights, has resulted in our recessions and stagnation.

If Eastern Europe’s nations would learn from the West’s successes–which were built on free enterprise and private property–but also from our mistakes–i.e., too much government–they could be well on their way to economic prosperity.  The private property-oriented suggestions offered herein can help lead Lithuania towards this goal.

APPENDIX

DRAFT PROJECT:

LAW ON FOREIGN CAPITAL INVESTMENT IN THE REPUBLIC OF LITHUANIA

Chapter 1

GENERAL PROVISIONS

  • Article Objective of the Law

This Law shall regulate relations between legal persons registered in the Republic of Lithuania and other foreign states, citizens of other states and stateless persons, making investments of their owned assets in the Republic of Lithuania, as well as relations between the State and foreign investors, as well as foreign capital investments during the whole period of their existence.

The Law shall not regulate the emergence, transformation and termination of ownership and related legal issues between foreign investor (investors) and legal and natural persons of the Republic of Lithuania, with the exception of cases established by this Law.

The provisions of this Law shall not regulate relations between citizens of the Republic of Lithuania and those of foreign states, stateless persons or legal persons of other foreign states, participating in the process of privatization of state property.

  • Article Definitions

Definitions as used in this Law.

“Objects of Investment” – production, trade, services.

“Entities of Investment” – legal persons, registered in foreign states, who make investments of foreign capital in the Republic of Lithuania, as well as citizens of other states and stateless persons, permanently residing abroad at the moment of making foreign capital investment.

“Foreign Investor (Investors)” – an investment entity whichever pursuant to the procedure established by laws has invested its owned assets in the Republic of Lithuania.

“Foreign Capital” – to an investment entity by the right of ownership, the following assets belonging:

  • convertible currency;
  • evaluated in convertible or Lithuanian national currency:
    1. real estate (buildings, constructions, premises and other real estate), located in the Republic of Lithuania or in other foreign states;
    2. industrial or intellectual property;
    3. movable property;

used to form or increase authorized capital.

“Foreign Capital Investment” – single legal action by which an investment entity puts its owned capital in the Republic of Lithuania.

“Foreign Capital Investments” – investment of investor’s capital in production, trade, services provided.

“Enterprise” – a newly established, reorganized or operating enterprise whereto a foreign capital is invested.

“Enterprise Controlled by Foreign Investor (Investors)”:

-upon the establishment, reorganization or participation in the operating enterprise the newly emerged right for a foreign investor (investors) to determine character or type of activity of an enterprise or to manage it (by a direct control right);

-by the establishment agreement of an enterprise and bylaws or acts of management bodies of an enterprise the granted right to a representative or representatives of an investor (investors) to determine character and type of activity of an enterprise or to manage it (by indirect control right).

“Investment Dispute” – a dispute between a foreign investor (investors) and the Republic of Lithuania on the amount of compensation for the appropriated property order and conditions of payment.

“Concession” – the compensation agreement for the permission to exploit state owned resources for a period defined in the agreement.

“National Regime” – legal environment whereat legal persons registered in foreign states, citizens of other states and stateless persons at the moment of making investments and within the period of existence of the investment enjoy the very same rights and have the very same responsibilities equal to those of legal and natural persons of the Republic of Lithuania, with the exceptions of cases established by this Law.

Chapter 2

FOREIGN CAPITAL INVESTMENT

  • Article Forms of Foreign Capital Investment

Investment entities shall enjoy a right, without any restrictions, with the exception of cases established in Article 10 of this Law, to invest their owned capital in the Republic of Lithuania by the following forms:

  • establishing an enterprise;
  • acquiring securities of operating enterprises;
  • establishing a commercial bank or acquiring shares in operating banks.

Legal persons, registered in foreign states, are entitled to open their mission in the Republic of Lithuania, which is not a legal person and may not be involved in economic-commercial activity.

Legal persons, registered in foreign states, are entitled to establish their branches, as well as establish subsidiaries or manage them.

  • Article National Regime

National Regime shall be applied to investment entities that invest their capital in the Republic of Lithuania.

Investment entities are considered foreign investors from the moment of establishment (registration) of an enterprise or acquiring shares of stock or bonds.

  • Article Amount of Foreign Capital Investment

Amount of foreign capital investment shall have to be not bellow than one thousand USD or equivalent in other convertible currencies, with the exception of cases set forth by Article 3 of paragraph 1, 2 and 3 subparagraphs.

  • Article Foreign Investment Guarantees

Foreign investments, investor’s profit, income, rights and legal interests in the Republic of Lithuania shall be protected by the State of Lithuania.

State authority bodies or governmental bodies shall have no right to encroach upon foreign investments or property of foreign investor.

Compensation for the appropriated property shall be paid no later than within three months in invested currency or Lithuanian national currency, if capital of an enterprise was formed by non-monetary (property) contributions, according to the actual market value of the property.

Compensation, received for the appropriated property, at the request of investors (investor) shall be transferred abroad without any restrictions.

Foreign investor (investors) in cases of investment disputes shall be entitled to apply directly to the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (I.C.S.I.D.), with reference to Convention “On Investment Disputes between Countries and Citizens of Other States” norms, adopted in Washington 18 March, 1965.

  • Article Establishment, Operation and Liquidation of an Enterprise

The procedure of establishment, operation and liquidation of enterprises and their legal status shall be defined according to the law of that type of enterprise.

Enterprises shall be registered by the procedure established by the authorized governmental body.

The procedure of establishment of a commercial bank with foreign or mixed capital shall be defined by the “Law on Commercial (Stock) Banks of the Republic of Lithuania”.

  • Article Formation of Capital of Enterprise

The owned assets of an enterprise shall be formed by monetary and non-monetary (property) contributions, as well as industrial and intellectual property.

Foreign investor shall have to make monetary contribution to the formed owned capital of an enterprise in hard (convertible) currency or in Lithuanian national currency in the manner established by the Government of the Republic of Lithuania.

Upon the agreement of parties, non-monetary (property) or industrial and intellectual property contributions shall be evaluated in convertible currency or Lithuanian national currency.

  • Article The Right of Acquisition of Shares of Enterprises and Credit Companies

Investment entity is entitled, without any restrictions, to acquire shares of enterprises and credit companies in all property forms, with the exception of cases set forth in this Article.

Investment entity may acquire only registered shares of state and state stock enterprises.

To acquire shares of state and state stock enterprises of specific destination investment entity may only by obtaining license to make a foreign capital investment by order established in Article 11 of this Law.

To acquire, increase (decrease) the amount of shares of credit companies up to 20%, 33% or 50% of a fixed capital of a bank a prior consent of Bank of Lithuania should be received.

Investment entity may acquire shares of enterprises or credit companies of all types of property for hard (convertible) currency or Lithuanian national currency.

  • Article License to Make a Foreign Investment or to Participate in Certain Types of Activity

Investment entity shall receive a license to make a foreign investment when:

  • investing in state and state stock enterprises of special destination, the list of which shall be approved by the Government of the Republic of Lithuania;
  • investing in an enterprise, holding a monopoly in the Lithuanian market or may gain a monopoly from the moment of making foreign capital investment.
  • Article The Procedure of Issuing a License to Make a Foreign Capital Investment

A license to make a foreign capital investment in cases set forth by Article 10 of this Law shall be issued by the Government of the Republic of Lithuania or its authorized body.

Foreign capital investment shall be made no later than six months from the date of the receipt of the license.

If the capital of an enterprise is not formed within the fixed period, the license shall be revoked.

Chapter 3

INVESTMENT OBJECTS WHEREIN FOREIGN INVESTMENT IS PROHIBITED OR LIMITED

  • Article Investment Object wherein Foreign Capital Investment is Prohibited

Foreign capital investments are prohibited in objects engaged in:

  • economic-commercial activity, related to the security and national defence of the Republic of Lithuania;
  • manufacturing narcotics, narcotic, harmful or poisonous substances;
  • growing, manufacturing and selling cultures, containing narcotic, harmful or poisonous substances;
  • manufacturing and selling weapons and explosives;
  • manufacturing vodka, wine, liqueurs and other alcoholic beverages;
  • manufacturing securities, banknotes and coins, and post stamps;
  • treating persons ill with dangerous and especially dangerous diseases, including venereal diseases and infections, skin diseases and aggressive forms of psychic diseases;
  • treating animals with especially dangerous diseases;
  • establishing or operating gambling houses, organizing games of chances or holding lotteries.
  • Article Foreign Capital Investment which is Prohibited without Concession

Exploration and exploiting of state owned natural resources is prohibited without a concession.

  • Article Activity of Enterprises, Controlled by Foreign Investor (Investors)

Enterprises, controlled by foreign investor (investors) shall be prohibited from:

  • operating state owned highways, railways, seaports, airports according to their functional purpose, these objects being of national significance;
  • operating oil and gas pipelines, communications, electric power transmission lines, heating systems, and ensuring technical functioning of these objects.

Chapter 4

THE PROCEDURE OF THE ACTIVITY OF ENTERPRISES

  • Article The Right of Enterprises to Use Land Plots and Real Property

Enterprises shall have the right to own or rent buildings and premises necessary for their commercial-economic activity, as well as to rent plots of land for the construction of said buildings accordingly to laws of the Republic of Lithuania.

State owned land may be leased for enterprise for up to 99 years, with a right of priority for extension of the lease.

Private land shall be rented according to the agreement of parties.

  • Article Accounts of Enterprises

Balance sheet and statistical accounting prescribed by laws of the Republic of Lithuania shall be applied to enterprises.

  • Article Interrelations between Enterprises and Financial and Control Bodies

Control over conformity of the business conducted by enterprises with the laws of the Republic of Lithuania shall be exercised by the bodies of State Control and financial bodies of the Republic of Lithuania.

Upon the demand of the bodies of State Control or financial bodies of the Republic of Lithuania, said enterprises must, within the limits established by the laws of the Republic of Lithuania, submit the necessary information on their activities for review.

  • Article The Responsibility of State Control Bodies and Officers

The control body must ensure the confidentiality of commercial secrets of enterprises reviewed.

The content of a commercial secret is established by the law.

The control body must compensate enterprise for losses incurred.

Losses are completely compensated from the state budget, if the control body proves it obtains no sufficient means to compensate the enterprise for the losses incurred.  The procedure and conditions for compensating losses from the state budget is established by the law.

Officers, having revealed commercial secrets of the reviewed enterprise, shall be prosecuted.

Chapter 5

TAXES AND TAX RELIEFS

  • Article Taxation of Enterprises

The procedure of taxation of enterprises shall be established by the Tax Law of the Republic of Lithuania.

  • Article Tax Reliefs and Tariffs

If an enterprise is registered in the Republic of Lithuania, profit (income) tax levied on the share of enterprise’s profit or income (proportionate to the share of foreign capital in the owned capital of the enterprise), and also reinvested in the production, shall be reduced by 70% for a 5 year period.  On the expiry of the period, profit (income) tax levied on the share of the profit (income) due to the foreign investment shall be reduced by 50% for a 3 year period.

The tax reliefs indicated in the first point of this Article shall be applied from the moment of the receipt of profit.

Other tax reliefs shall be applied according to tax laws and other laws of the Republic of Lithuania.

If an enterprise is liquidated by the consent of founders during the time when tax reliefs are valid or within 3 years since the expiration of tax relief term, it must pay the difference between profit tax and profit tax reliefs when they were valid.

Alternative of Article 20

Profit and income of enterprises, registered in the Republic of Lithuania, is taxable in general manner.

  • Article Responsibility for Violating Tax Law

Penalties, established in the laws of the Republic of Lithuania, for violating of tax laws shall be applied to enterprises.

  • Article Disposition of Profit or Dividends, Derived from Foreign Capital Investment

Dividends, profit or a portion of a profit in hard currency of a foreign investor (investors) shall be repatriated or transferred abroad without any restrictions.

Foreign investors may also transfer all or a portion of their profit, dividends in form of products or services acquired on the Lithuanian domestic market, or reinvest said income in the economy of the Republic of Lithuania.

  • Article Customs Reliefs

Contributions of foreign investors to the owned capital during the period of formation or increasing thereof shall be exempt from custom duties.

If an enterprise is liquidated by the decision of founders, assets or part of property repatriated of foreign investors and property acquired by foreign investors for profit or dividends shall be exempt from customs duties.

Chapter 6

FINAL PROVISIONS

If an international agreement sets other conditions of making a foreign capital investment or existence of the investment than this Law, in that case an international agreement shall be prevailing.

COMMENTS

To ensure effective functioning of this Law, it is necessary to make complex amendments in laws related to the establishment and activity of economic entities.  For example, the following amendments shall be made in “Law on Enterprises of the Republic of Lithuania”, as well as in other laws:

-to separate a branch from a legal person;

-to clearly define features of subsidiaries;

-to provide a right to establish an enterprise (legal person) for one founder;

-to draft and adopt a law, in which opportunity to form capital of an enterprise on the basis of general partial property of founders would be determined.

***      Insurance of Enterprises

The property of enterprises in the Republic of Lithuania must be insured by state or private insurance agencies, regardless of whether same is insured in other localities.

******            The Procedure of Conducting Financial Operations of Enterprises

Financial operations of enterprises shall be conducted through banks registered in the Republic of Lithuania.  Enterprises may open bank accounts in other states as well.

References

[1].  For further discussion of some of the methods for reducing political risk, and related international law issues, discussed in these comments, see the following articles by Paul E. Comeaux and myself:  Reducing the Political Risk of Investing in Russia and Other C.I.S. Republics:  International Arbitration and Stabilization Clauses, Russian Oil & Gas Guide p. 21 (Vol. 2, No. 2, April 1993); United States Bilateral Investment Treaties with Russia and Other C.I.S. Republics, Russian Oil & Gas Guide p. 23 (Vol. 2, No. 3, July 1993); Insurance for U.S. Investments in Russia and Other C.I.S. Republics:  MIGA and OPIC, Russian Oil & Gas Guide p. 3 (Vol. 2, No. 4, October 1993); and Political Risk and Petroleum Investment in Russia, Currents, International Trade Law Journal Summer 1993, at 48.

[2].  The views of the Austrian school of economics on the subjective nature of value are extremely insightful.  For a classic treatment, see Ludwig von Mises, Human Action:  A Treatise on Economics (3d. ed. 1966) (1949).  See also the further Austrian economics insights contained in Murray N. Rothbard, Man, Economy, and State:  A Treatise on Economic Principles (1962) (two volumes) and Hans-Hermann Hoppe, A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism:  Economics, Politics, and Ethics (1989).  For a forthcoming detailed review of Hoppe’s latest book, see my article The Undeniable Morality of Capitalism, 25 St. Mary’s Law Journal ___ (Vol. 25, No. 4, June 1994) (review essay of Hans-Hermann Hoppe, The Economics and Ethics of Private Property (1993)).  To obtain these books, contact the Ludwig von Mises Institute (Auburn University, Auburn, Alabama, 36849, telephone 205/844-2500).

[3]See Rothbard, supra note , at 604-15, discussing “The Illusion of Monopoly Price on the Unhampered Market.”  See also Chapter 1 of Hoppe, supra note , “Fallacies of the Public Goods Theory and the Production of Security.”

Comments on Draft Project of “Law on Foreign Capital Investment in the Republic of Lithuania, Memorandum to Mr. M. Černiauskas, President, Association of Lithuanian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (November 18 1993).

  1. Stephan Kinsella

 

713/752-4360

 

November 18, 1993

 

 

Association of Lithuanian Chambers of Commerce and Industry

Attn:  Mr. M. Černiauskas, President

Re: Comments on Draft Project of “Law on Foreign Capital Investment in the Republic of Lithuania”

Dear Mr. Černiauskas:

Mr. E. Blake Mosher, Chief Executive Officer of Mosher International, Inc., recently informed me of your Draft Project of “Law on Foreign Capital Investment in the Republic of Lithuania,” and of your desire to receive comments on the draft.  This letter contains my comments on the draft laws.  Please be aware that the comments that follow are my own opinion and do not necessarily represent the views of Jackson & Walker, L.L.P., my employer.

*     *     *

Comments on the Draft Project of “Law on Foreign Capital Investment in the Republic of Lithuania”:  A Free Market Perspective

  1. General Considerations—Protection of Private Property Rights………… 2
  2. Specific Suggestions………………………………………. 2
  3. International Commitment—Concessions and Stabilization Clauses……… 2
  4. Expropriation of Investors’ Property…………………………………………………… 3
  5. Natural Resources…………………………………………….. 4
  6. Taxation… 5
  7. Leases on State-Owned Land…………………………………………. 5
  8. Reduce Regulations on Acquisitions of Shares…… 6
  9. Legal Monopolies and Other Monopolies………….. 6
  10. Prohibited Investments………………….. 6
  11. Presumption of Permissiveness of Actions……………………… 7
  12. Contract Rights as Property Rights…………………………………… 7

III.  Conclusion………………………………………….   7

1)  General Considerations—Protection of Private Property Rights

As a general proposition, Lithuania will be successful in attracting foreign capital investments in proportion to foreign investors’ ability and chances at making profits in Lithuania.  The more that private property is protected under Lithuania’s policies, the greater an investor’s ability to make more long-range future plans, which increases the chances of success and also increases the amount of profits which can be expected.  Additionally, if an investor’s property rights are well-protected, he is also more likely to be willing to invest in Lithuania in the first place, since he has more confidence that any profits he earns, he will be able to keep.  Finally, a strong Lithuanian policy of protection of private property will reduce the political risk of doing business in Lithuania, which also will increase the amount of profits that can be earned and will decrease the costs of doing business, thereby attracting more investments in Lithuania.

As discussed above, the more that property rights are protected, the more investments Lithuania will attract.  Further, Lithuania gives up nothing at all by strengthening investors’ private property rights, except the discretion to expropriate investors’ property.  However, in order to become successfully industrialized, Lithuania will have to refrain from such expropriations anyway, in order to have a stable and productive market economy.  Thus, it is virtually costless to Lithuania to increase the protections afforded to foreign investors, and this would benefit Lithuania by making it a more attractive place for investors.

With these general considerations in mind, I feel that the Draft Project of “Law on Foreign Capital Investment in the Republic of Lithuania” (hereinafter referred to as the “Draft Law”) should be modified to strengthen as much as possible the protections offered to foreign investors.  Below I offer my suggestions as to some of the ways in which this might be done.

3)  Specific Suggestions

  1. a) International Commitment—Concessions and Stabilization Clauses

Although the Draft Law purports to give investors certain protections and property rights, there is nothing which would prevent the Lithuanian government from changing this law.  If an investor must rely upon the existence of the law to be sure that his property rights will be respected, then his property rights will be uncertain to the extent the government is likely and able to simply revise or abolish the law which gives his property protections.  Even if the Draft Law were to state that the government may not pass future laws which violate property rights vested in foreign investors by the current law, the concept of “legislative sovereignty” means that a future legislature is always able to change the law.

One way to resolve this problem is to internationalize the protections and promises made by Lithuania concerning the sanctity of investors’ property.  One way to do this is through a treaty, by which a state obligates itself and becomes bound under international law.  Although this does not physically prevent the state from breaching the treaty, states are far more reluctant to breach an international obligation than to merely change one of its own internal laws.  Thus the Bilateral Investment Treaties (“BITs”) entered into between some pairs of nations, such as Russia and the United States, offer strong protections for the property rights of foreign investors.  I would therefore recommend that Lithuania enter into BITs with the U.S. and other Western states.

 

International law also recognizes the ability of a state to bind itself internationally through individual contracts between the state and foreign investors, sometimes known as concessions, and referred to herein as investor-state contracts.  Any such investor-state contract should contain an international arbitration clause, which can give jurisdiction to a neutral third party, as well as a so-called “stabilization clause.”  The stabilization clause would provide that the law in force in the Lithuania at a given date—typically, the time the investor-state contract takes effect—is the law that will supplement the terms of the contract, regardless of future legislation, decrees, or regulations issued by the government.

 

Therefore I recommend that all the protections afforded to investors in the Draft Law be internationalized.  The Draft Law should include a provision authorizing and requiring the government to issue a form contract or license from the state to the investor, which contains international arbitration and stabilization clauses, and which incorporates all the protections embodied in the Draft Law as of the date of issuance of the license.  This would do no more than to extend the protections embodied in the Draft Law into the license, thereby internationalizing and thus strengthening the private property rights afforded in the Draft Law.

Any time an investor began to invest in Lithuania, he would automatically receive such a license from Lithuania, containing a solemn contractual guarantee from Lithuania to abide by the promises made in its Draft Law, and to not change the internal laws of Lithuania in a way that would diminish the property rights guaranteed to him.  Investors receiving such licenses would be more confident that Lithuania does not intend to expropriate their property or raise taxes to a confiscatory rate.  This would increase Lithuania’s attractiveness and stability, would reduce political risks faced by investors, and would thus encourage greater investment into Lithuania.

 

  1. c) Expropriation of Investors’ Property

 

Article 6: Foreign Investment Guarantees states that “State authority bodies or governmental bodies shall have no right to encroach upon foreign investments or property of foreign investor.”  This seems to indicate that an investors’ property rights should be respected by the government, which implies that the government will not expropriate or nationalize such property.  However, the next paragraph states “Compensation for the appropriated property shall be paid no later than within three months in invested currency or Lithuanian national currency, if capital of an enterprise was formed by non-monetary (property) contributions, according to the actual market value of the property.”  This sentence appears to contemplate government appropriation (i.e., expropriation or nationalization) of investors’ property.

 

My first comment in this regard is that this apparent inconsistency should be eliminated and the law clarified.  If no expropriation of private property by the state is to be allowed, the law should not contemplate that it may occur.  If, on the other hand, expropriation is to be allowed, it should be limited in scope to only narrow situations.

 

I would recommend clearly stating that the government does not have the right to expropriate an investor’s property, nor the right of eminent domain.  Since values are subjective, it is impossible to determine an “appropriate” amount of compensation to pay an investor for the “value” of the property which is taken.  However, if it is politically unacceptable to remove the government’s power of eminent domain, which is likely, the Draft Law should clearly state that, in the event of an expropriation, the full value of the property should be received, which includes the market value of both lucrum cessans (future profits lost) and damnum emergens (damages).  This “full value” standard will help to protect both the value of the investor’s property, as well as the property itself, since the government is less likely to expropriate property the more compensation it would have to pay for it.

 

Additionally, the Draft Law should state that investments shall not be expropriated, directly or indirectly (which includes both indirect and “creeping expropriation”), unless:  (1) for a public purpose; (2) performed in a nondiscriminatory manner; (3) upon payment of prompt, adequate and effective (i.e., full value) compensation; and (4) in accordance with due process of law.  The law should provide that any legal expropriation that complies with these international law requirements must be accompanied by full compensation, as discussed above; any expropriation not in accordance with these provisions should be deemed an illegal expropriation, and a higher amount of compensation should be awarded—for example, the value of the property take times three, a treble damages standard often found in anti-trust and other laws.

 

  1. e) Natural Resources

 

Article 13: Foreign Capital Investment which is Prohibited without Concession, provides that exploration and exploitation of state owned natural resources is prohibited without a concession.  As discussed in Part 0, above, any property rights acquired by investors should be protected also through a standard form of license or other form of investor-state contract, which internationalizes Lithuania’s promises to respect investors’ property rights.  Certainly a concession, if it contains international arbitration and stabilization clauses, performs this function.  Therefore, the concession described in this Article should provide, similarly to the license I suggest in Part 0, above, that the concession will contain international arbitration and stabilization provisions.

 

  1. g) Taxation

 

Article 19: Taxation of Enterprises, should be amended to provide that tax rates shall not be raised higher than the rates in effect at the time the investor began its investment; or, that foreign investors shall never be treated less favorably, i.e., taxed at higher rates, than nationals of Lithuania; or both.  The Article should provide that any prohibited increase in taxes includes both direct and indirect tax increases, including the effects of inflation, which is caused by government expansion of the money supply and is economically equivalent to a tax.  If these guarantees were fortified by the internationalized, routinely-granted license I suggest in Part 0, above, investors would be more confident that the taxes in effect currently would not increase and eat away at their profits.  This certainty of the ability to earn and retain profits would be an additional incentive for investors to invest in Lithuania.

 

Moreover, if Lithuania is able to do so, it should eliminate all tariffs and taxes of whatever kind, except perhaps for a modest amount of sales taxes, which could be imposed on foreign investors, with this situation backed by an internationalized promise as discussed above.  Lithuania could become a tax haven and the resulting rush of investors to invest in Lithuania could transform its economy virtually overnight.

 

Alternatively, Article 20: Tax Reliefs and Tariffs, provides for income tax reductions for five and three year periods.  These periods should be extended as much as politically feasible, and the percentage reductions on tax rates should be increased as much as politically feasible.

 

Article 20 also provides that, if an enterprise is voluntarily liquidated during the time when these tax reliefs are in force, or within three years thereafter, the investor must disgorge the “saved” tax reliefs that they received.  This provision is one of the worst provisions in the Draft Law.  It should definitely be abolished.  It is wrong to think that an enterprise can be made to be profitable by force, threats, or coercion, which is what this law amounts to.  This law provides a perverse incentive for companies investing in speculative or risky enterprises to avoid investing in Lithuania, for it effectively increases the potential losses the investor may face.  In order to have successful businesses, businesses must also be allowed to fail when market conditions so dictate.  If firms’ ability to fail is removed, so is the ability to succeed—just as an individual can only be moral if he is free to choose both the right and wrong course of action.

 

  1. i) Leases on State-Owned Land

 

Article 14: The Right of Enterprises to Use Land Plots and Real Property provides that State owned land may be leased for enterprise for up to 99 years.  This provision should be amended to allow or even require the government to internationalize any such lease, i.e., to include international arbitration and stabilization clauses in the lease contract to ensure that rights granted to investors-lessees are protected as fully as possible.

 

  1. k) Reduce Regulations on Acquisitions of Shares

 

Article 9: The Right of Acquisition of Shares of Enterprises and Credit Companies requires that foreign investors must procure the consent of the Bank of Lithuania in order to acquire up to 20%, 33%, or 50% of the shares of credit companies.  Such regulations are unnecessarily burdensome and costly for investors, and tend to increase the cost of business and thus reduce the incentive for investment in Lithuania.  Such regulations also presume that the investor has in improper purpose.  However, for law-abiding investors, it should be presumed that the investor has no improper purpose and is attempting to legally and properly make a profit by creating wealth.  The requirement to obtain the Bank of Lithuania’s consent before acquiring varying percentages of shares in credit companies should be deleted or at least diluted or ameliorated.

 

  1. m) Legal Monopolies and Other Monopolies

 

Article 10: License to Make a Foreign Investment or to Participate in Certain Types of Activity requires an investor to obtain a license when investing in certain enterprises holding a monopoly in the Lithuanian market.  While a legal monopoly, such as the government’s monopoly over the printing of money or the building of roads, is a true monopoly, the concept of a non-legal monopoly has always been a problematic one, and legal systems would be well-served to abolish this concept.  Typically “monopoly power” is attributed to any successful company that prospers and grows because it is innovative, efficient, and satisfies its customers’ demands.  Thus to punish firms for being “monopolies” is to punish success and flourishing, which is exactly what Lithuania needs to encourage in order to build a healthy, robust economy.  Therefore Article 10 should be amended to require a license only for investments in legal monopolies.

 

  1. o) Prohibited Investments

 

Article 12: Investment Object wherein Foreign Capital Investment is Prohibited prohibits foreign investments in certain sectors of the economy.  Some of these are defensible on sovereignty or national security or defense grounds, such as illegal narcotics and weapons.  However, items 5-9—manufacturing of alcoholic beverages; securities, banknotes, coins, and stamps; treating of certain dangerous illnesses; treating animals with certain diseases; and gambling activities—are unduly restrictive.  Each of these activities, as long as they are legal, could benefit from the increased capital, know-how, technology, and competition which would result from allowing foreign investors to invest in these areas.  For example, if wine or beer can be made more cheaply or more efficiently or in greater variety due to foreign capital or control, there is no reason to deny Lithuanian citizens the benefits of having greater options to choose from.  As the successful history of privatization shows, private enterprises can efficiently perform activities traditionally relegated to government’s purview, such as minting of coins.  Items 5-9 should therefore be deleted from the list of prohibited investments.

 

  1. q) Presumption of Permissiveness of Actions

 

In the original American constitutional system, it was presumed that all actions by individuals were permissible unless expressly prohibited by government.  This is a general presumption of individual liberty.  The opposite system which has been implemented in certain countries is that only actions which are expressly permitted by the government are allowed, while anything else is prohibited.  It is essential for businesses that the former system be in place, rather than the latter.

 

To that end, the Draft Law should contain a provision which provides that, in cases of doubt or ambiguity, or where the Draft Law or other laws are silent, it is presumed that any investment-related activity of a foreign investor is permissible and legal.  Thus, investors would be free to engage in actions not prohibited by the Draft Law.  This would increase the certainty of the legality of options open to investors, and would hence broaden their range of legal options, which increases investors’ ability and chance of making profit.  This, in turn, increases Lithuania’s attractiveness as a host country for investment.

 

  1. s) Contract Rights as Property Rights

 

Often it is unclear whether contractual rights are property rights or something related, but different.  Because contract rights—for example, accounts receivable—are assets as important to many companies as tangible property like land and buildings, the Draft Law should clearly provide that “property” and “property rights” includes all sorts of rights, including immovables such as land, movables such as office equipment, corporeals and incorporeals, intellectual property rights, and contract rights, all of which are equally protected private property rights.

 

 

5)  Conclusion

 

In my opinion one of the problems the emerging economies of Eastern Europe face is that too much attention is being paid to the advice of Western governments.  Western governments are facing their own problems now, primarily because of too much government interference and regulation in the free market, which, ultimately, is the only creator of wealth.  Eastern Europe should be wary of accepting the advice of Western governments to tax and regulate the market, adopting our IRS, SEC, and anti-trust laws.  The soundest critique of Western economic problems has been that explaining why government intervention and the erosion of property rights has resulted in our recessions and stagnation.  If Eastern Europe’s nations would learn from the West’s successes—which were built on free enterprise and private property—but also from our mistakes—i.e., too much government—they could be well on their way to economic prosperity.  The private property-oriented suggestions offered herein can help lead Lithuania towards this goal.

 

*     *     *

 

Enclosed with this letter are the following articles which you may find of interest and which discuss in detail many of the suggestions made above, written by myself and Mr. Paul E. Comeaux, who also works here at Jackson & Walker in our International Law Practice Group:

 

  • Reducing the Political Risk of Investing in Russia and Other C.I.S. Republics: International Arbitration and Stabilization Clauses, Russian Oil & Gas Guide p. 21 (Vol. 2, No. 2, April 1993);

 

  • Political Risk and Petroleum Investment in Russia, Currents, International Trade Law Journal Summer 1993, at 48;

 

  • United States Bilateral Investment Treaties with Russia and Other C.I.S. Republics, Russian Oil & Gas Guide p. 23 (Vol. 2, No. 3, July 1993); and

 

  • Insurance for U.S. Investments in Russia and Other C.I.S. Republics: MIGA and OPIC, Russian Oil & Gas Guide p. 3 (Vol. 2, No. 4, October 1993).

 

Also enclosed is an article you may find useful written by Mr. J. Lanier Yeates, a partner in Jackson & Walker’s Energy Section and the Head of our International Law Practice Group, and by Gary B. Conine, Professor of Law at the University of Houston Law Center:  Russian Petroleum Legislation:  Assessing the New Legal Framework, Russian Oil & Gas Guide p. 3 (Vol. 2, No. 1, January 1993).  I have also enclosed with this letter copies of recent issues of our firm’s International Law Practice Group Newsletter, each of which also contain a brief description of our firm’s international law practice.

 

If you have any questions or if I can be of further assistance, please do not hesitate to write or call me.

 

 

Very truly yours,

N. Stephan Kinsella

Encl.

cc:

E. Blake Mosher (Mosher International, Inc.)

J. Lanier Yeates (Jackson & Walker)

Paul E. Comeaux (Jackson & Walker)

Professor Rosalyn Higgins (London School of Economics)

 

Blake Mosher said, telephone conf. 11/30/93:

 

[Note at end of file: This draft law is similar to the current one enacted, he thinks, in 1992.  It’s currently being debated in parliament.  This draft was probably submitted by some member or group in parliament, and the Lithuanian Chamber of Commerce here was asked to procure comments thereupon.]

{ 1 comment }

[Update: The book was published April 2, 2020; more information here.]

As noted in previous posts, 1 in 2005 I published International Investment, Political Risk, and Dispute Resolution: A Practitioner’s Guide, co-authored with Noah D. Rubins, an American international arbitration attorney in Paris.  The text has been widely adopted, well-received, and critically praised. For example:

“The book is a tour de force. Rubins & Kinsella have written a first-rate study of one of the most vital areas of international law today. Notwithstanding its subtitle (“A Practitioner’s Guide”), scholars as well as practicing attorneys will find this an invaluable guide to understanding the multifaceted adjudicatory regime for cross-border investment disputes.”
William W. Park, R. Gordon Butler Scholar in International Law and Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law; General Editor, Arbitration InternationalCounsel to Ropes & Gray; former Vice-President, London Court of International Arbitration; publications include the casebook International Commercial ArbitrationInternational Chamber of Commerce Arbitration (3rd ed.); International Forum SelectionIncome Tax Treaty Arbitration; and Arbitration of International Business Disputes: Studies in Law and Practice.

“This book is comprehensive, well-written, and balanced. An admirable mixture of learned commentary and primary documents, it is portable, authoritative, and up-to-date. It is a distinctive and well-organized addition to existing reference works and will be of great value to practioners and academics who seek a dependable, balanced treatment of a range of legal and practical questions affecting foreign direct investment and dispute resolution.”
Jack J. Coe, Jr., Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law; author, Protecting Against the Expropriation Risk in Investing Aboard(Matthew Bender 1993); International Commercial Arbitration–American Principles and Practice (1997); NAFTA Chapter 11 Reports (with Brower and Dodge); vice-chairman, International Commercial Arbitration Committee, ABA International Law Section.

“This book provides an excellent account of how legal techniques can be used to provide significant protections to foreign investment. Its comprehensive coverage, clarity of expression, and useful appendices will prove invaluable to the busy lawyer. It is one of those rare books that is valuable not only for practice but also for the law classroom.”
Professor Dan Sarooshi, Professor of Public International Law, University of Oxford; Barrister, London; author of International Organizations And Their Exercise Of Sovereign Powers and The United Nations and the Development of Collective Security: The Delegation by the UN Security Council of Its Chapter VII Powers

But a lot has happened in law and international arbitral practice since 2005, so it’s time for an update. Noah and I have enlisted the help of a third co-author to contribute to a second edition, which Oxford University Press—UK has agreed to publish. It should be out in March 2020. Available for preorder: OUP Product Page.

The book will be part of the Oxford International Arbitration Series, and will include a preface by the Series Editor, Professor Loukas Mistelis. It will be promoted alongside other leading investment arbitration titles such as McLachlan, Shore and Weiniger’s International Investment Arbitration and Irmgard Marboe’s Calculation of Compensation and Damages in International Investment Law. As noted on the OUP-UK site,

The [Oxford International Arbitration Series] publishes books of quality and originality on subjects of practical importance in modern international arbitration, focusing on emerging topics and pervasive issues. The series provides both practitioner and scholarly readers with titles which offer a high standard of analysis.

Our new co-author is an impressive scholar: Thomas N. Papanastasiou, an Assistant Professor of the Law Faculty of Neapolis University of Paphos (Cyprus). Thomas is licensed to practice with the Athens Bar, and holds a Ph.D. with a focus on International Investment Law and an M.A. in International Relations from Waseda University of Tokyo, as well as an LL.M. in Civil Procedure, and an LL.B. from Kapodistrian University of Athens (Greece). He has worked as a consultant to international organizations, such as the World Bank and to consulting firms in Japan and Europe. His research focuses on public international law, foreign investments, energy law, international development and human rights; his publications include: The Legal Protection of Foreign Investments against Political Risk: Japanese Business in the Asian Energy Sector (Quid Pro Books, 2015; Amazon); and Corruption in the Infrastructure Provision: The Role of Accountability Mechanisms in the Community Driven Development Projects of Indonesia (NOVA Publishers, 2016).

My other co-author, Noah D. Rubins, an American international arbitration attorney in Paris, also has extremely impressive credentials and experience. Noah is an attorney in the international arbitration and public international law groups of Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer in Paris. He has advised and represented sovereign and private clients in arbitrations under ICSID, ICC, AAA, Stockholm Arbitration Institute, and UNCITRAL rules, and has also served as arbitrator under the UNCITRAL and ICC Rules. He specializes in investment arbitration, particularly under the auspices of bilateral investment treaties and NAFTA. Co-author of Investor-State Arbitration (forthcoming), he has published widely in the field of international investment and dispute resolution, and has taught foreign investment law at Georgetown Law Center in Washington, DC. He received a Masters degree in dispute resolution and public international law from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, a J.D. from Harvard Law School, and a bachelor’s degree in international relations from Brown University. Before entering the law, Noah served as attaché at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, and founded a foreign-policy think tank in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan.

The current version of IIPR sells for only $245—what a bargain compared to my other books (e.g. $3487.00 for the seven-volume Digest of Commercial Laws of the World published by Thomson/Reuters).

***

Update: All revised and new chapters submitted, new Preface and Introduction completed. So now it’s in the publisher’s hands. Publication is expected in March 2020. Here’s the current graphic for the cover.

  1.  Preface and Introduction to International Investment, Political Risk, and Dispute Resolution: A Practitioner’s Guide and New Publisher, Co-Editor for my Legal Treatise, and how I got started with legal publishing. [↩]
{ 2 comments }

In a previous post 1 I mentioned how I got started in legal publishing as part of my law career. One of the books I mentioned was International Investment, Political Risk, and Dispute Resolution: A Practitioner’s Guide, co-authored with Noah D. Rubins, an American international arbitration attorney in Paris. This book was published in 2005 by Oceana Publications, which was then acquired by Oxford University Press. The publisher recently granted permission for me to publish the Preface and Introduction and some ancillary material such as the index and table of contents. It may be downloaded here (in PDF form).

[Update.]

Many of my free market and libertarian friends know mainly of my writing and in those areas, but I’ve also published a good deal on the legal and practitioner side—not that there is no overlap between them (for example, I’ve written on IP law, as a lawyer, as well as IP policy, as a libertarian). This book is primarily legal and practitioner related (but also attempts to present the material in a detailed, scholarly way), but one driving goal for this project was to help find practical, legal ways to protect property rights of capitalistic companies and investors from takings by the host state. That is one reason my dedication was to Hans-Hermann Hoppe, the world’s preeminent Austrian economist and libertarian theorist. I explained some of our motivation for writing the book in the Preface:

As globalization continues, foreign direct investment, including investment in developing economies, continues to grow each year as well. Political risk—the risk that a host government will interfere with the property rights of a foreign investor—is therefore a topic increasingly central to strategic discussions within both governments and the international business community. While domestic legal, economic and political considerations are critical to assessing political risk, international law also plays an important role. State responsibility for investor protection, treaties protecting foreign investment, political risk insurance, the immunity of states from suit in national courts, and international arbitration between states and investors are just a few of the matters governed or affected by evolving principles of international law.

There has long been a need for a current reference work integrating these and other issues related to international investment and political risk. Many of the relevant topics have been addressed in law journals or monographs, but never as part of an integrated analysis of political risk. And while there is certainly a wealth of material concerning the international law of investment protection, much of it is written from an academic viewpoint rather than from the perspective of assisting businesses and governments in avoiding or reacting to the conflict between interests private and public, foreign and domestic.

The 1997 Oceana monograph Protecting Foreign Investment Under International Law: Legal Aspects of Political Risk, penned by one of the present volume’s co-authors and his former colleague, Paul Comeaux, was written to address these and other topics. As one reviewer wrote, “The book is very useful for beginners as an introduction and easier to access and use than the much more comprehensive and in-depth studies by Sornarajah and Muchlinski.” 2  Another commented:

This book provides an in depth analysis of the political risk associated with foreign investment—that the host government may decide to nationalize, or otherwise interfere with, alien property rights. It succinctly identifies the decisional factors including treaties, political risk insurance, sovereign immunity, and arbitration between States and investors. It serves as a useful primer for investors, corporate counsel, and anyone interested in expropriation litigation disputes. 3

Since the previous book was released eight years ago, far more attention has been paid to some of these topics, in particular investor-state arbitration. This is no surprise: the number of cases registered at the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes between 1997 and 2001 was equal to the number initiated before 1997 since the Centre’s inception in 1965.

The present volume addresses the same issues as did the 1997 work, with updated and expanded coverage. Our goal here is to enable the investor to appreciate the risks associated with government interference in property rights, to minimize those risks and deal effectively with their consequences. But we also hope to promote understanding within host governments about investors’ expectations and concerns, to allow them to avoid conflict and maximize the benefits of foreign direct investment for their countries and constituencies.

This book is addressed to a wide audience, and is written to appeal to lawyers and non-lawyers alike. It is suitable as a primer for attorneys and investors seeking to familiarize themselves with international law pertaining to political risk. It is also addressed to both in-house and outside counsel for corporations who either have made or are contemplating foreign direct investment in developing (or other) countries. Experienced attorneys involved in expropriation-related litigation should also find this book useful as a reference guide to important principles of international law related to political risk. It should also be useful to law students studying international law and academics seeking a reference work pertaining to the legal aspects of international investment and political risk. Last but certainly not least, government officials and attorneys can glean important information about the mindset of foreign investors and their likely course of action should State measures adversely affect their investment. We hope that practitioners will find the sample and source documents in the appendices of use as well, both for comparison purposes and for ease of reference.

We are convinced that the reduction of political risk, through the active participation of both host countries and foreign investors, is a critical factor in the improvement of the human condition worldwide. Entrepreneurship and capital investment are essential to the expansion of prosperity. This conviction, in addition to a more detached enthusiasm for the subject of our practice and research, is one motivation for undertaking this book and, we believe, has spurred us to forcefully explain both how investors can protect themselves, and the ways that host States can make such protection superfluous. It should be noted that, regardless of the authors’ policy preferences, we have attempted to remain strictly objective in evaluating the realities of international law, business, and politics.

… To two individuals we owe special thanks, and it is to these two that we dedicate this book. One of the authors (Kinsella) has been lucky enough to be befriended and informally mentored by Professor Hans-Hermann Hoppe, a leading libertarian theorist and Austrian school economist in the tradition of Ludwig von Mises. Hoppe’s brilliant and tireless advocacy of the principles of individual liberty, sound economics, and international trade, peace and harmony has been an inspiration. …

I am obliged to note here that the material in the file is copyright 2005 Oxford University Press, and is reprinted here by permission of Oxford University Press, USA. The book may be found on Oxford’s website here.

Further information, such as book reviews and online resources and links to various institutions, websites, services, and other resources pertaining to topics discussed throughout the text of the book may be found here.

  1. New Publisher, Co-Editor for my Legal Treatise, and how I got started with legal publishing[↩]
  2.  T. Wälde review, CEPMLP Internet Journal, vol. 3 (1998). See also review by Assad Omer, Transnational Corporations, vol. 10, no. 1 (UNCTAD, April 2001). [↩]
  3. American Society of International Law: Reader’s Corner (Issue #16, June 1998). [↩]
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Recent Developments in Jurisprudence and Legislation (1994)

One of my earliest published articles (and delivered speeches). From 1994. HTML from Word version below; PDF. When I was a young lawyer at large law firms, I took every chance I could to publish, get my name out there, etc. (see New Publisher, Co-Editor for my Legal Treatise, and how I got started with legal publishing).

 

 

Recent Developments in Jurisprudence and Legislation

by

Robert O. Thomas & N. Stephan Kinsella

Jackson & Walker, L.L.P.

Houston, Texas

41 LSU Mineral Law Institute Ch. 6 (1994) [continue reading…]

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This is an article I published in the Philadelphia Lawyer, p. 20 (Fall 1997) (PDF), about the now-defunct Multilateral Agreement on Investment, or MAI. At the time I was in favor of it and somewhat naively optimistic that a fairly universal pro-private property rights agreement might be adopted. Sigh.

For more background on related matters, see my book International Investment, Political Risk, and Dispute Resolution: A Practitioner’s Guide (Oxford University Press, 2005) and my Online Appendix XVII, “Online Resources” [update: International Investment, Political Risk, and Dispute Resolution: A Practitioner’s Guide, Second Edition (Oxford, 2020)].

The Re-emerging International Framework for Protection of Investment

By Stephan Kinsella 1

(version submitted to The Philadelphia Lawyer, September 1997 issue)

We’ll take and take until not even the nails in their shoes are left.  We will take American investments penny by penny until nothing is left.

                                                                                                 —Fidel Castro, 1960  2 

Less than seventy-five years after it officially began, the contest between capitalism and socialism is over: capitalism has won.

                                                                                        —Robert Heilbroner, 1989 3

American entrepreneurs are, by and large, used to operating within a relatively fixed and predictable background of overarching state and federal laws.  If something goes wrong with a business transaction—e.g., one party breaches a contract or intentionally defrauds or harms another—the wronged party that he can very likely resolve the matter in some court, according to some applicable law, whether federal or state.

Similarly, if an investor’s property rights are damaged or otherwise taken by the government, the investor can obtain redress, typically in the form of compensation, in court.  In the West, though protection of property rights is far from perfect, it is largely taken for granted that the government is constitutionally prohibited from taking one’s property (including investments) without due process and just compensation.  Thus, trade and investment flourish in western countries, since both contractual and property rights and protected.

International trade, and investment in foreign countries (known as foreign direct investment), require protection as well. With respect to foreign trade—for example, trade between an American company and a foreign company—the parties cannot simply assume that they are both subject to jurisdiction in the courts of the same nation. Despite this seeming difficulty, however, foreign trade has been able to thrive since disputes can be settled, and contracts enforced, even between parties of different nations.  This has long been possible with the international Law Merchant, in which disputes between merchants of different countries are settled in neutral, largely private arbitration proceedings.

Today, for example, private arbitration is frequently conducted in accordance with the rules of the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), or the American Arbitration Association (AAA).  In addition, dispute resolution and other aspects of foreign trade are buttressed to some extent by the foreign trade framework established by multilateral agreements such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and its successor, the World Trade Organization (WTO).  Thus, private parties have been and continue to be able to rely on and enforce the contracts necessary for foreign trade.

Foreign direct investment is another matter.  Companies investing in other countries are not able to rely on private measures such as arbitration agreements to ensure that the host state (the state hosting foreign investment) does not interfere with investments. States have sovereignty over property within their territory, and thus foreign investment is always subject to the threat of expropriation by the host state. Investing in foreign regimes is thus said to be subject to “political risk,” especially in those states with a history of hostility to capitalism and property rights, such as the former communist states and other developing economies. [continue reading…]

  1. LL.M., University of London; J.D., M.S., B.S., Louisiana State University.  The author is a member of the Intellectual Property Department and International Law Practice Group of Schnader Harrison Segal &amp; Lewis in Philadelphia, and co-author <i>Protecting Foreign Investment Under International Law: Legal Aspects of Political Risk</i> (Dobbs Ferry, New York: Oceana Publications, 1997).  Email: nskinsella@shsl.com; http://www.shsl.com.  The views expressed herein are those of the author alone, and should not be attributed to any other person or entity. [↩]
  2. New York Times, 21 August 1960, § 3(F), p. 1, quoted in Eric N. Baklanoff, Expropriation of U.S. Investment in Cuba, Mexico, and Chile 112 (1975). [↩]
  3. Robert Heilbroner, “The Triumph of Capitalism,” The New Yorker, Jan. 23, 1989, p. 98.  The superiority of capitalism over socialism had been rigorously proved back in 1920 by the great Austrian economist Ludwig von Mises.  See Ludwig von Mises, Economic Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth (1990) (1920); see also Ludwig von Mises, Socialism: An Economic and Sociological Analysis (J. Kahane trans., 3d rev’d ed. 1981) (1922).  Mises’s ideas were initially thought to have been refuted by socialist economists, in what is known as the “socialist calculation debate.”  The false conclusion that the socialists won the debate by disproving Mises’s claims was perpetuated in the following decades by economists such as Heilbroner.  See, e.g., Robert Heilbroner, Between Capitalism and Socialism (1970), pp. 88-93, in which Heilbroner claimed that Mises was wrong, that socialist economic calculation was possible, and that the “superior performance” of socialism would “soon reveal the outmoded inadequacy of a free enterprise economy.”  Despite decades of unjust and unfortunate neglect, Mises has finally been vindicated by the universally acknowledged failure of socialism as a viable economic system.  See Gertrude E. Schroeder, “The Dismal Fate of Soviet-Type Economies: Mises Was Right,” Cato J., v. 11, no. 1 (Spring/Summer 1991), p. 13; “Labor Party leader flips on policy,” Philadelphia Inquirer, Apr. 8, 1997, p. A2 (describing the British Labor Party’s endorsement of privatization of state-owned enterprises and recent elimination of a Marxist clause in its constitution advocating common ownership of the means of production).  Even Heilbroner now admits: “It turns out, of course, that Mises was right.”  Robert Heilbroner, “After Communism,” The New Yorker, Sept. 10, 1990, p. 91, 92.  See also Mark Skousen, “‘Just because socialism has lost does not meant that capitalism has won’: Interview with Robert L. Heilbroner,” Forbes, May 27, 1991, p. 130.  For further discussion of the socialist calculation debate, see Murray N. Rothbard, “The End of Socialism and the Calculation Debate Revisited,” 5 Rev. Austrian Econ. 51 (1991); Don Lavoie, Rivalry and Central Planning: The Socialist Calculation Debate Reconsidered (1985); David Ramsay Steele, From Marx to Mises: Post-Capitalist Society and the Challenge of Economic Calculation (1992). [↩]
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Back in the 1990s, I wrote several critiques of foreign investment laws for some developing countries, some at the request of the American Bar Association’s  Central and East European Law Initiative, or CEELI, including:

I’ve lost the text files for all of these except the report on Romania’s draft foreign investment law, and that of Lithuania (linked above). The Romanian report text is reproduced below.

 

M E M O R A N D U M

March 25, 1997

TO:                 Mr. John C. Knechtle

Director, Legal Assessments, ABA/CEELI

FROM:           N. Stephan Kinsella [current contact info as of 04/2002: www.KinsellaLaw.com]

RE:                 Draft Law on Stimulation of Foreign Investment for the Republic of Romania

Note: The following are my comments on the referenced Draft Law. Please note that these comments are my personal opinion and do not represent the opinion of my firm, Schnader Harrison Segal & Lewis, or any of its clients. In the following, my focus, in general, is on the issue of whether and to what extent the Draft Law serves to protect private property, in particular private property related to foreign direct investment in Romania.

General Reaction

The Draft Law is commendable in that it is an attempt by Romania to add further protections to the private property of foreign investors. However, the Draft Law is problematic in that it is somewhat vague, it does not go far enough in protecting the private property of investors, and it leaves too much discretion in the hands of government in deciding whether to accord “special” treatment to investment. The Draft Law also rests on the assumption that some investments ought to be given favorable treatment, which rests on the false assumption that some investments are objectively “worse” than others, and that the government can accurately assess which investments are relatively more desirable than others. The Draft Law will result in some investors being given favorable treatment with respect to other investors, which is problematic and undesirable. To the extent possible, the Draft Law should be revised to clarify and strengthen the security of a foreign investor’s property rights, as explained in more detail below. The protections provided by the law should be broadened and extended to as many investors and types of investment as possible to reduce the discriminatory treatment that the Draft Law would otherwise provide.

Preliminary Considerations

The protection of private property of foreign investors is essential if Romania is to attract foreign direct investment. This is the essential touchstone by which any proposed policy, law, regulation, or regime is to be judged. The degree to which private property rights are respected is extremely significant in attracting foreign investment. The Draft Law should be amended to clarify and strengthen the security of a foreign investor’s property rights, for example by taking steps to lower political risk and taxation rates.

Many changes to the legal and political climate of Romania could be suggested to contribute to these factors. Constitutional, limited government, low taxes, respect for private property, the free market, and civil liberties contribute to both a health economy and to a low political risk.

Promulgating a pro-foreign investment law which provides for government guarantees that property rights will be respected can also play an important role in attracting foreign investment. However, as investors are all too aware, even a pro-investment law may be changed at a later time by the legislature due to the government’s legislative sovereignty. A new government may desire to nationalize certain industries, for example. Thus, the ability of Romania to promulgate new laws that might override property rights previously guaranteed to investors tends to reduce the attractiveness of any government guarantees that are made. For a developing economy such as Romania, such guarantees should be made more effective by reducing the chance that the laws will change to investors’ detriment.

One way to increase the likelihood that such a guarantee, once granted, will be respected by future governments is to implement a constitutionally limited government, with an independent judiciary having the power of judicial review. Another way is to make the guarantees binding under international law, since states are often reluctant to be seen as clearly violating international law. An investment agreement executed between the host state and investor accordingly may be “internationalized,” so that the state’s obligations contained therein are binding under international law. For example, the agreement may contain both an international arbitration clause, which grants jurisdiction to a neutral third party (such as the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)), and a stabilization clause. A stabilization clause provides that the law in force in the state on a given date is the relevant law for purposes of interpreting the investment agreement, regardless of future legislation. This effectively “freezes” the legal regime in place on a certain date, so that any future changes in law contrary to the state’s guarantees are without effect, at least under international law.

General Comments

The Draft Law essentially assumes that there is some background protection of the private property of foreign investors, such as that provided by international law, other municipal laws in force, or by treaties entered into by Romania (see, e.g., Art. 3). The Draft Law then attempts to add another measure of protection to foreign investors by providing for various tax and custom duty exemptions or favorable rates, and other incentives, if the investment qualifies for such treatment under the Draft Law or in the determination of the Government. (Art. 4.)

One problem with the foreign investment regime established by the Draft Law is that it will result in some types of investment being favored over others. This presumes that some types of investment are objectively superior, more efficient, or otherwise more preferable than others; and that the Government accurately assess proposed investments accordingly. However, government is notoriously incapable of determining which type and amount of investment or other capital allocation is efficient or proper. This is why Russian-style centralized economic planning has failed so disastrously. Economic planning on a more modest scale is also unwise. Government is unable to centrally collect the relevant information that would be required to efficiently allocate capital; and even if all the relevant information could be centrally collected, government is unable to efficiently allocate capital since centralization destroys the private property and market price system that otherwise efficiently allocates capital. 1 Further, even assuming away these problems, decisions will tend to be made or at least influenced by political factors, such as favoritism, corruption, bribery, and special interest lobbying.

Another problem with the Draft Law is that at least some of the incentives provided are provided only at the discretion of the Government. The incentives provided in Arts. 6 and 7 appear to be available as long as the more or less objective conditions of Art. 5 are met. However, the additional incentives contemplated under Art. 8 are available only if the Government so approves; and the amount and types of incentives to be provided appear to be wholly within the discretion of the Government or the Romanian Development Agency (RDA). Further, it is not clear that an investor denied the incentives under Arts. 6 and 7 have any legal recourse to challenge this decision, so the incentives of these Arts. appear to be discretionary as well, for all practical purposes. (Additionally, the incentives under Arts. 6 and 7 require the RDA’s approval. Art. 5.)

One problem with such discretion is that it is bound to be misused for corrupt or petty purposes—e.g. influenced by bribery, special interest group lobbying, and other forms of political favoritism—from time to time. This will lead to an inefficient selection of favored investments. Further, such discretion will make Romania a less attractive home state for investment from the outset, since the discretion increases the uncertainty as to whether the investor will be able to obtain the maximum incentives available. Such favoritism can also cause an investor to fear being put to a competitive disadvantage with other investors receiving more favorable treatment. Finally, giving discretion to the Government will likely lead, in the long run, to fewer favored investments than would be favored under an overall more liberal investment policy.

The law could be improved by reducing this discretion, and by providing for a legal right of an investor to challenge a decision relating to the approval of these incentives in a Romanian court, or, better yet, in an international arbitration forum.

As mentioned above, favoritism or discrimination in investment treatment can be problematic. Ideally, there should be no discrimination between foreign investors, on the basis of nationality or any other criterion. Rather, all foreign investors (and, for that matter, municipal or local investors) ought to enjoy equal, i.e. MFN treatment. Otherwise, foreign investors could be justifiably concerned that competition between them is not fair.

A superior alternative, then, to the present regime contemplated by the Draft Law would be to accord the maximum feasible protection of private property rights to all foreign investors and types of investment. This would reduce the overhead expenses associated with government oversight, reduce corruption, and spur overall investment to a greater extent than would be obtained from piecemeal and discretionary favorable treatment.

Another general consideration concerns bribery and corruption. Bribery and corruption of public officials is well-known in many developing countries. However, American investors are prohibited by the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b) et seq., from engaging in such activities. If bribery and political corruption are widespread in Romania, American investors will be at a competitive disadvantage with respect to investors from other regions such as Western Europe. Thus, given the existence of the FCPA, the existence of widespread bribery and corruption will tend to reduce American investment in Romania.

It is preferable, for the reasons given above regarding internationalization of obligations, that the Draft Law be given as much force as possible by internationalizing it, for example by making its terms part of a multilateral treaty or bilateral investment treaties (BITs), or by incorporating its provisions into internationalized, stabilized investor-state contracts. Romania also ought to attempt to strengthen the protections of private property and foreign investment provided in BITs and other treaties. Romania also ought to support the negotiation of the OECD’s multilateral agreement on investment (MAI), and seek to accede thereto as soon as possible. 2

The Draft Law should include a Statement of Principles that clearly indicates that Romania recognizes the importance and sanctity of private property, and that purpose of the Draft Law is to protect the private property rights of foreign investors. Such a statement may be useful in persuading investors that Romania is serious in its commitment to protecting and respecting investors’ property rights. This statement would also increase the chance that the Draft Law, in cases of ambiguity, would be interpreted in favor of investors’ property rights.

“Foreign investment” is insufficiently defined in the Draft Law. Further, it is often unclear whether contractual rights are considered to be property rights on an equal footing with other types of property rights. The Draft Law should clearly define foreign investment, and should provide that foreign investment includes “property” and “property rights” or foreign investors, including immovables and movables, corporeals and incorporeals, intellectual property rights, and contract rights. As a general matter, it is preferable to adopt general terminology or concepts utilized in or compatible with established Western legal systems, primarily Anglo-American common-law concepts and terms.

Detailed Comments

The following comments are made with reference to the relevant section of the Draft Law. These comments assess various provisions of the Draft Law without further criticizing the Draft Law’s assumption that favorable investment conditions will be accorded only to some investors or types of investment, and only at the Government’s discretion. Thus, the suggestions below are aimed at strengthening the investment protections currently provided by the Draft Law, even though it would be preferable if these investment protections would not be handed out selectively by the Government.

Art. 2. The term “foreign capital companies” is not well-defined. Also, the fact that the treatment to be given to such companies is to be “in accordance with the laws in force” serves to reduce the certainty of any guarantee of treatment by making it conditional on laws in force.

Art. 5. The capital requirements ought to be lowered as much as feasible to extend the favorable coverage provided by the Draft Law to as many investments as possible.

Art. 6. The term “contribution in cash effectively disbursed” is confusing and unclear.

Art. 7. The three-year exemption from payment of import customs and value-added taxes ought to be extended as much as possible, for example to six, ten, twenty years, or longer. Another useful change would be to allow the exemption period to be indefinitely repeated for an investor. This automatic renewal of protections could be usefully applied to other favorable treatments provided by the Draft Law.

A problematic aspect of Art. 7 is the provision that the exemptions provided therein are conditioned upon the investor’s securing of financing of imports using sources from abroad that do not encumber Romania’s “balance of payments.” This ought to be completely deleted from the Draft Law, since it rests on the economically fallacious (but widespread) mercantilist idea that there can be a “favorable” or “unfavorable” balance of trade. Unlike a budget deficit, which is undesirable, it is irrelevant whether there is a trade “surplus” or “deficit,” since this results from the sum total of a large number of individual credit transactions, each of which presumably benefits both parties thereto. 3 Developing economies ought to be careful not to adopt fallacious economic doctrines unwisely adopted in the West in this century. While the West’s free-market systems are worth emulating, various Western policies are not, such as our anti-trust laws, fiat-money and Federal-reserve-controlled banking system and other Keynesian-based institutions and policies, protectionism, and the like.

Art. 8 contains several possible “additional incentives” that are unacceptably vague, such as “high technology,” “free writ of possession over land,” and the like.

Art. 9 states that the RDA provides investment counseling to foreign investors. It is not clear why this ought to be monopolized or even engaged in by a government agency. Private enterprise would better fill this need.

Art. 13. The prohibition against nationalization or expropriation of investments should be clarified and broadened, to clarify that these concepts include both indirect and creeping expropriation.

Arts. 13 and 14. The provision for compensation in the event of a (lawful) expropriation should be clarified to provide that the full, market value of nationalized property will be paid to the expropriated investor, and the concept of “equitable” principles enunciated in Art. 14 ought to be examined to ensure that there is no implication that less than full compensation can be awarded. Additionally, the following standard should be adopted to make clear to investors Romania’s commitment to the sanctity of the investors’ property rights: the standard of compensation should be the greater of the full market value of the investment, or the commercial value to the investor (which may be greater than the market value due to synergy, etc.) Further, the Draft Law should clarify that any taking is “illegal” if not done for a public purpose, or if done in a discriminatory manner. This will help to dissuage Romania from engaging in such an expropriation for fear of being seen as commiting an unlawful taking, which should help to ensure investors that Romania is sincere and serious about respecting the property rights of investors.

Art. 15 provides for a disputed amount of compensation to be established “through the courts of law, in accordance with the legal provisions.” It is unclear to what “the legal provisions” prefers. It is also unclear whether “the courts of law” contemplates only Romanian courts or whether international arbitration is available. Courts should be empowered to nullify the effects of an illegal taking or nationalization. Further, international arbitration should be authorized, and commitments in the Draft Law internationalized if possible, as discussed above.

Art. 17. “Non-mediated foreign investment” is unclear in meaning, and consequently the meaning and purpose of this article is unclear as well.

Art. 19. The certificate of investor ought to be internationalized, e.g., by stabilization and international arbitration clauses, or protected through BITs or other treaties if possible.

Recommended Commentary

Paul E. Comeaux & N. Stephan Kinsella, Protecting Foreign Investment Under International Law: Legal Aspects of Political Risk (Dobbs Ferry, New York: Oceana, 1997) [see also Rubins, Papanastasiou & Kinsella’s International Investment, Political Risk, and Dispute Resolution: A Practitioner’s Guide, Second Edition ]

Paul E. Comeaux & N. Stephan Kinsella, “Reducing Political Risk in Developing Countries: Bilateral Investment Treaties, Stabilization Clauses, and MIGA & OPIC Investment Insurance (original version), 15 New York Law School Journal of International & Comparative Law 1 (1994) (copy attached)

N. Stephan Kinsella, “Lithuania’s Proposed Foreign Investment Laws: A Free Market Critique,” Russian Oil & Gas Guide, Apr. 1994, at 60 (copy attached)

Bernard H. Siegan, Drafting a Constitution for a Nation or Republic Emerging into Freedom (2d. ed. 1994)

Robert W. McGee, “Some Tax Advice for Latvia and Other Similarly Situated Emerging Economies,” 13 International Tax and Business Lawyer 223 (1996)

Daniel T. Ostas & Burt A. Leete, “Economic Analysis of Law as a Guide to Post-Communist Legal Reforms: The Case of Hungarian Contract Law,” 32 American Business Law Journal 355 (1995)

“Symposium: Development of the Democratic Institutions and the Rule of Law In the Former Soviet Union,” including the article by Judith Thornton, “Economic Reform and Economic Reality,” 28 John Marshall Law Review 847 (Summer 1995)

  1. For more discussion of the problems of centralized economic calculation, see Paul E. Comeaux & N. Stephan Kinsella, Protecting Foreign Investment Under International Law: Legal Aspects of Political Risk (Dobbs Ferry, New York: Oceana, 1997), app. I; Ludwig von Mises, Socialism: An Economic and Sociological Analysis (J. Kahane trans., LibertyClassics 3rd rev’d ed. 1981); Ludwig von Mises, Human Action: A Treatise on Economics (3d rev’d ed. 1966), pp. 200-31, 695-715; Murray N. Rothbard, ‘The End of Socialism and the Calculation Debate Revisited,” 5 Rev. Austrian Econ. 51 (1991); Collectivist Economic Planning (F.A. Hayek ed., 1935). [↩]
  2. For further discussion of the MAI, see “American Bar Association Section of International Law and Practice Report to the House of Delegates: Multilateral Agreement on Investment,” 31 International Lawyer 205 (1997) [see also Kinsella, An International Framework for the Protection of InvestmentPhiladelphia Lawyer, p. 20 (Fall 1997) (text version)]; and William H. Witherell, “Developing International Rules for Foreign Investment: OECD’s Multilateral Agreement on Investment,” 32 Business Economics 38 (January 1997). [↩]
  3. For further discussion of the fallacy that a balance of trade deficit is harmful to an economy, see Murray N. Rothbard, Man Economy, and State: A Treatise on Economic Principles (1962), ch. 11, 5 10; Ludwig von Mises, Human Action: A Treatise on Economics (3d rev’d ed. 1963), ch. XVII, §14; Frederic Bastiat, Economic Sophisms (Arthur Goddard trans., Foundation for Economic Education ed. 1964), ch. 6; David Boaz, Libertarianism: A Primer (1997). pp. 176-81; Clichés of Politics (Mark Spangler ed., 1994). § 72, p. 260. [↩]
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Louisiana Civil Law Dictionary Review

My recent book, Louisiana Civil Law Dictionary(Quid Pro Books, 2011), co-authored with an  Austro-libertarian legal scholar friend, Gregory Rome, was recently reviewed at the iPhoneJD blog:

November 13, 2012

Review: Louisiana Civil Law Dictionary — ebook of civil law words and phrases

I’ve reviewed several legal dictionary apps for the iPhone and iPad — Black’s Law DictionaryBarron’s Law Dictionary,Nolo’s Plain English Law Dictionary, the Book of Jargon series by Latham & Watkins — but considering that dictionaries were traditionally books, it makes sense that an ebook dictionary could be just as useful on the iPhone and iPad as an app.  Proof of this is found in the Louisiana Civil Law Dictionary, an ebook by Chalmette, Louisiana attorney Gregory Rome and Houston, Texas attorney Stephan Kinsella.  You can purchase this ebook in several formats including Kindle and Nook, and this review is based on the iBooks version of the ebook.  The book is published by ebook publisher Quid Pro Books, the brainchild of Tulane Law Professor Alan Childress.  Prof. Childress sent me a free review copy a few weeks ago.

As you may know, unlike the other 49 states where the law is based on English common law, the law here in Louisiana is based on civil law from jurisdictions such as France.  That means that we have concepts in Louisiana that are very similar to common law concepts but have different names (e.g. “liberative prescription” instead of “statute of limitation”), plus we have many civil law concepts that are unique to Louisiana.  Black’s Law Dictionary does a decent job with some civil law terms, but a dedicated source like the one has the ability to offer more … and I was impressed by this book.

The Louisiana Civil Law Dictionary includes all of the civil law terms that I use in my practice and a bunch more that were new to me.  (I may have learned some of them when I took the bar exam back in 1994, but that space in my brain has long since been replaced by other knowledge.)  The definitions are clear and complete, and the book includes lots of hyperlinks that make it easy to jump around in the book.  Plus it is easy to slide the marker at the bottom of this ebook to jump to different sections.

IMG_1743 [continue reading…]

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Update: Second Edition of International Investment, Political Risk, and Dispute Resolution Forthcoming from Oxford University Press; and see also Advice for Prospective Libertarian Law Students.

As most of my libertarian friends and readers know, I’ve published for a number of years books and articles in the area of political and legal theory. I’ve also engaged over the years in more practical legal writing, from law review articles to authored and edited books (I maintain a separate website, KinsellaLaw.com, for my legal practice). My legal writing has primarily covered intellectual property and patent law, and international law topics. I started writing in both areas–libertarianism and law–at the beginning of my legal career, in the early 1990s.

Book covers

The way I got into legal publishing may be of some interest to aspiring legal scholars and law students. Some of my early legal writing was based in part on some of the international business law I learned during my LL.M. at University of London–many of these were published in the Russian Oil & Gas Guide and other fora, while I was an associate practicing oil & gas law at Jackson Walker in Houston, at the encouragement of my boss and mentor, Lanier Yeates. (For more on how I ended up in London, see The Start of my Legal Career: Past, Present and Future: Survival Stories of Lawyers.)

These were all co-authored with my friend and colleague Paul E. Comeaux. We put a lot of this together into a more comprehensive law review article, “Reducing Political Risk in Developing Countries: Bilateral Investment Treaties, Stabilization Clauses, and MIGA & OPIC Investment Insurance,” 15 New York Law School Journal of International and Comparative Law 1 (1994). This piece was scholarly yet practical. Shortly after the piece came out, we were approached by Susan DeMaio, a project editor at Oceana Publications, an international law publisher. Susan suggested we turn the article into a book. Paul and I did this, resulting in Protecting Foreign Investment Under International Law: Legal Aspects of Political Risk (Oceana Publications, 1997). Years later, I co-authored International Investment, Political Risk, and Dispute Resolution: A Practitioner’s Guide (Oxford University Press, 2005), a successor volume to the 1997 book. This was published with Oxford which had by then acquired Oceana; my co-author was Noah D. Rubins, an American international arbitration attorney in Paris. (A second edition was published in 2020.) [continue reading…]

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